Gabriel Andreescu

Globalizing Hypocrisy For a humanist approach to the ethics of memory[1]

Notes on the Writing of This Book

While writing this book I constantly came up against the vulnerability of the bibliographic materials. The claims as to facts, documents, and ideas put forward in some works contained errors, which was the case with not only press sources, but also academic papers. I made wide-ranging checks of the claims put forward in those books where I found errors. In an otherwise useful book, from which I decided to quote, the number of Tutsis killed in the 1994 Rwanda genocide was put at two million, whereas the officially accepted estimates give figures of around eight hundred thousand.[2] It was also necessary to verify footnotes.[3]

A number of inaccuracies, which may originally have been deliberate, have migrated from one work to another to the point where they now form the 'consensus' of the mainstream literature. One textbook example is the Polish law to counteract holding the Polish state responsible for concentration camps on its occupied soil during the Second World War. The claim repeated in the great majority of articles criticising the law, to the effect that it penalised any debate on the ways in which Poles collaborated with the Nazi régime, was false. And this was far from being the only fallacy concerning this law. Deliberately misleading claims, cherry-picking to suit one's own opinions, and a lack of rigour all fuel hypocrisy.

Situations that developed during the course of my research were a potential source of distortion affecting the rigour of this book's information. I started work towards the end of 2017, but in May 2020, by which time the manuscript had largely taken shape, I learned of claims that a Russian diplomat had arrived in the Czech Republic armed with poison intended to be used against the Mayor of Prague and two other officials. In mid-June 2020, however, the claims were

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[1] Gabriel Andreescu, *Globalizarea Ipocriziei. Pentru o abordare umannistă a eticii memoriei*, Polirom, Iași, 2023.
The book was awarded:
The Leibniz Prize for Philosophy, offered by the Leibniz Society of Romania, 2024 edition
The "Nicolae Iorga" Prize of the Romanian Society of Historical Sciences, 2024 edition
The "Vasile Conta" Prize of the Romanian Academy, 2025 edition.
The translation from Romanian to English was made by British writer Alistar Blyth.

[2] There was also a report by the Organisation of Student Survivors of Genocide that put the number killed in the Rwanda Genocide at two million. (Edwin Musoni, 'Rwanda: Report Claims 2 Million Killed in 1994 Genocide', *The New Times*, 4 October 2008.
https://allafrica.com/stories/200810040044.html?utm_campaign=wp_todays_worldview&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld). This figure has not been confirmed, however.

[3] An article published by the Atlantic Council refers to a Pew poll as having been conducted in 2016 although it was in 2018 (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-anti-semitism-racism-and-the-far-right/). Such an error would be irrelevant were it not that dramatic changes take place in the region from one year to the next.

shown to have been a rumour spread by a Russian diplomat, subsequently expelled. Up until I submitted the final manuscript, I continued to verify developing situations that might produce similar surprises. Be that as it may, I was unable to find any method for identifying every single instance requiring amendment.

Given the wide variety of claims and interpretations and the sensitivity of the subject of research, I opted to quote directly as much as possible, rather than summarising the ideas of the authors cited in such instances. The quotations alter the flow of the text, but in dealing with such a subject, what took priority was the importance held by every word and every means of expressing ideas. Likewise, the documents themselves, here a major source of the analysis, by their very nature often demanded precise reproduction of what they stated. I deemed that in a field where there exist acutely conflicting stances, it is all the more necessary to engage in debate with all one's cards on the table. Finally, I reproduced longer passages when they were vital not only for the information and ideas they contained, but also for their 'ethos'.

The quotations underline the fact that a book entails 'a dialogue'. I have used quotation marks wherever I deemed it necessary to emphasise a meaning, a nuance, an interpretation on my own part or that of the authors cited.

I have made systematic use of footnotes with the aim of making more explicit or adding further nuance to the arguments made in the main text. Some notes are simple bibliographic references, while others supplement the information or interpretations found in the main body of the text.

I have not provided the dates when articles were retrieved from the Internet, which is standard practice in scholarly works, given the large number of such references. Every reference in the book was still online as of 1 January 2022, when the manuscript was nearing completion. Given that a number of websites went offline in the interval between when I started writing the book and when the final version was ready, I found others dealing with the same subject. This led to further changes to the manuscript. For example, a quotation from Mikis Theodorakis was expressed differently on the new website than it was on the one I had originally used, probably due to a different translation from Greek into English, and in the end, I dropped the later reference, drawing on a third source. In once exceptional instance, I made reference to a video to which I did not have access and which I was unable to verify: Alexander Dugin's appeal to kill Ukrainians, filmed on 12 June 2014 and cited by Taras Kuzio. The video cannot be accessed because it was a private upload. But since a number of references to this video appeal coincide in what they say, I set aside my scruples as to verifiable proof.

The bibliography contains solely those books and studies cited in the book. Given the vastness of what has been written on each of the topics in the book, numerous other

'bibliographic samples' could have been called upon to enter into dialogue with its arguments.[4] The multidisciplinary nature of the research means that the bibliography is somewhat eclectic. Although useful and necessary, references to newspaper articles and press releases have not been reproduced in the bibliography, but appear only in the notes to where they are cited in the main text.

Introduction

Aims

The research was initially concerned with 'asymmetries of memory' in Europe, guided by the assumption that a 'European memory' was possible. The most significant challenge of such an undertaking was to reconcile competing memories of the Holocaust and the Gulag.[1] At the outset, I oriented myself towards the militant direction of thought which claims that shared memory is the precondition for forging a European identity.[2] The aspiration towards a 'continental memory' is supported by a vast literature on 'asymmetry', covering national and supranational memory policies.[3]

Over the course of my research, such assumptions were consigned to the margins, if not ruled out one by one. The speculative and attractive premise of a 'shared European memory' is not borne out by the diversity of national communities.[4] It is by virtue of such differences that 'the Europe of today, the same as in the past, is shaped by the struggle for memory'.[5] The thesis is implicitly to be found in another claim: Europe and its memory are fluid realities.

There are substantial arguments against attempts to create a universal interpretation of history, such as a joint European textbook. It has been argued that such initiatives can be pointless, on the one hand, and dangerous, on the other.[6] A humanist ethics of memory is conditional upon not a shared universal memory, but universal standards of fair play.

The restrictiveness of memory policies in Europe would seem to have impoverished the outlook considerably. A large number of today's agents of memory engage in the tasks of cross-border clarification, awareness-raising, pressure, negotiation and societal change. Prominent figures, groups, and states themselves—such as Israel, the United States, Poland, Germany, the Russian Federation, France and Ukraine—wield a decisive influence over the approach to memory throughout Europe.[7] Prominent European figures, groups, networks, states, and E.U. institutions do likewise internationally. We live in a 'global public space' that has created a 'comparable temporality', leading to a 'globalisation of relations with the past.'[8] The 'globalisation of memory' encompasses all modern democracies and has an impact even on autocracies, albeit in the form of its rejection.[9]

[4] On the scale of the research potentially relevant to this book, it should be noted that by the end of 2021, the scholarly literature included more than 35,000 references in the field of 'Holocaust and Genocide Studies' alone (www.academia.edu/search?q=Holocaust%20and%20Genocide%20Studies).

The privileged part played by the memory actors (agents, entrepreneurs) in relation to history itself is consistent with the nature of the social construct that is the collective memory.[10] Another aspect that motivates this focus on memory agents is the extraordinary dynamic of the memory phenomenon in recent decades, for which they have been responsible. The collective memory has always played a part in constructing political communities, but the emergence of memory politics as a distinct field and the amplitude it has acquired in recent decades are unprecedented. We are experiencing the golden age of collective memory.[11]

I was interested in the normative aspects of collective memory, which open up the path to an ethics of memory.[12] I wagered on the heuristic function of the dialogue between Law and Ethics. The normative approach that is specific to Law introduces operating criteria for the assessment of 'asymmetries'. [13] The politics of memory constructed in Europe over the course of more than two decades by means of laws, resolutions, statements, and programmes,[14] or created by the jurisprudence of international courts, fosters symmetries at the level of principle and differentiations at the technical level.

Why the 'Globalisation of Memory' and in What Sense?

The energy collectively invested in shaping memory has created a terrain that lends itself to the abuse of that very memory. What has been promoted and, in response, delegitimised is sacralisation of the past and, at the other extreme, a cheapening thereof, a promotion of their own interests on the part of the proponents of memory even as they deliver moral homilies to others.[15] Such attitudes nurture a wider phenomenon, which I have named the *globalisation of hypocrisy*. In certain of its aspects, the asymmetry of memory is an element of the globalisation of hypocrisy.

In this book, the term 'hypocrisy' describes a social phenomenon, although obviously it also implies hypocritical psychologies on the part of individuals.[16] *Anti-Semitisation* and *Russophobisation* are glaring examples of the globalisation of hypocrisy given not only how extensively but also how vehemently they have been practised, in such a manner as to preclude the requirements of dialogue.[17] Although they are useful, I employ the two terms sparingly, as the language does not seem to integrate them easily. In the new context of the invasion of Ukraine since 24 February 2022, the Russian élites' invocation of Russophobia has gone beyond 'hypocrisy' to become blatant defiance of the international community.

In order to draw a line around the globalisation of hypocrisy, I have examined notorious examples of anti-Semitisation: the cases of Günter Grass, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, David Irving, and the anti-Semitisation of the Polish people. The deviant elements in the approach to memory are transparent in the strategy of Russophobisation, including 'The Russiangate Hysteria',[18] the campaign against the Baltic States, the Russophobisation of the Poles, and the explosion in labelling since Russia's occupation of the Crimea.

The globalisation of hypocrisy cannot be reduced to a manifestation of a less than honest will. Ethnic and ideological sensibilities, compounded by the inherent difficulties of managing

complex situations arising from identity, permeate narratives of collective memory to the point of making them seem mutually irreconcilable. I have traced how divergences of memory manifest themselves in a number of textbook cases: the 'Bronze Soldier' of Tallinn, the Estonian monument at Lihula, the citizenship of Russian speakers in Latvia, and national emancipation in Poland and the Baltic States after the Second World War. I was able to monitor the relevant cases up until the beginning of 2023.

Initially, I did not have in view any privileged space of research. It quickly emerged, however, that there was a 'frontline of memory' where asymmetries, divergences, and competing memories were at their acutest: the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine, Israel, and the Russian Federation. In these cases, the national reconstruction of collective memory aspired to the definition of narratives that would play the rôle of a 'global collective memory'.[19]

Germany stands apart among the other maps of national memory. Its unique position, that of having enacted almost ninety years ago its plan for the industrialised extermination of Europe's Jews, has led to creation of a specific culture of Holocaust memory. In Germany, non-public expressions of negationism, humanist acts and even support of constitutional values have been sanctioned under the pressure of accusations that they damaged the memory of the Holocaust. The European Court of Human Rights recognises Germany's historical responsibility and has not censured this approach, which might be deemed 'extreme' in relation to the classic principles of the balance of rights.[20] Although Germany conducts a responsible policy regarding the memory of communism in Europe, the distance between the two 'memories' is striking in the German context. Statues to the fathers of Marxist-Leninism are erected even today, and texts glorifying communism are published without hindrance—a situation that would be unimaginable if applied to Nazi figures or writings. The German State has turned the negation of Nazi crimes into a criminal offence throughout the European Union while also preventing any similar policy towards the negation of communist crimes.

Militant Theories

The 'globalised hypocrisy' that is the object of this research is organised, structural, legally codified. I have given priority to 'militant' theories of memory, to those positions, theories and concepts with regard to memory that support the imposition of univocal national and supranational norms that are at the same time partisan. Called upon to provide answers to complex situations, the militant theories employ simple explanations, standardise ideas, and stigmatise viewpoints that deviate from the 'standard'.

The first category and most significant category of militant theories concerns the definition of the Holocaust, the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and the working definition of anti-Semitism. Assessment of this category brings into discussion the contexts that radicalise it. I have made a foray into the 'new anti-Semitism', that strange alliance between left-wing

movements in the West and Islamic anti-Semitism. I examine the asymmetric treatment that U.N. bodies apply to Israel. Since 2013, the U.N. Council for Human Rights has passed forty-five resolutions condemning Israel, which in 2018 accounted for 45.9% of all the one-country resolutions adopted by the Council. The fact that in 2020, at the height of the global pandemic, the World Health Organisation held a session singling out Israel, accusing it of infringing its obligations regarding the health of the population in the Palestinian territory, speaks of a long tradition of U.N. partisanship.

An elaborate critique of the militant methods, some of them excessive, employed in the name of combatting anti-Semitism comes from within the Jewish community itself. In a joint statement on the European Parliament's adoption of the working definition of anti-Semitism put forward by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (I.H.R.A.), eleven Jewish organisations demanded that it be rejected. The principle cited in the statement, to the effect that the definition of anti-Semitism should be restricted to acts motivated by hatred towards Jews, would salvage the legitimate expression of opinions about Israel and Palestine. The organisations involved regard it as illegal to label as 'anti-Israel', and therefore anti-Semitic, acts that do not express hatred towards Jews.

It would nonetheless be mistaken to view the militant theories, headed by the thesis of the uniqueness of the Holocaust, from a strictly academic perspective. Behind rationalised presentation 'via theory' there lie fundamental ethical feelings, such as ethnic solidarity with the suffering of the millions of Jewish children who suffered terror at their approaching death and the boundless suffering of the mothers and fathers from whose sides the children were snatched. But empathy and reason are universal, and the second of the two is able to de-capsulate feelings, redirecting them outward into the wider world of solidarity with suffering.

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The militant Russian narratives rest on the pillars of the 'Great Patriotic War' and corollary subjects: the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and Soviet relations with Nazi Germany up until the outbreak of war; presentation of the war with the Soviet Union as an expression of the courage and sacrifice of the 'great Soviet people'; the 'liberation' of Central and East European countries from the Nazi 'yoke'; the assertion of a supposed anti-fascist and anti-anti-Semitic Soviet identity that would legitimise Russia's campaigns against the 'fascist and anti-Semitic attitudes' of states that the Kremlin views as enemies.

The militant Russian theories were brought to the fore of international debates on memory by the Putin régime, but they had precedents in the Soviet period. In 2014, Vladimir Putin passed a law criminalising 'the negation of facts recognised by the international military tribunal that tried and sentenced the major war criminals from the European Axis countries, approval of the crimes tried by that tribunal, and the deliberate spreading of false information about the acts of the Soviet Union during the Second World War'; likewise 'the spreading of

information concerning military commemorations and memorials connected to the defence of Russia that is clearly disrespectful of society and publicly profanes the symbols of Russia's military glory.'[21]

In 2019, a law made it a punishable offence to display 'a flagrant lack of respect' towards Russian society and Russian state officials, while another law criminalised the spreading of fake news online—accusations also wielded to punish criticism of 'historical' theses. Having become part of the school syllabus, reiterated at national events, and systematically promoted by the government, the militant theories peddled by the Kremlin have monopolised the memory of Russian society for the long term.[22] Just how deeply this propaganda affects Russians' behaviour has been demonstrated in the war against Ukraine.

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The concept of 'militant theories' does not imply any disrespect for militancy or civic action as key drivers of evolving human rights. Action from the bottom up is essential nourishment in achieving moral utopia. At the same time, authors who warn against the effects of militancy play a rôle that is just as necessary to truth and justice. Although they may err on the side of overgeneralisation or simply by the fact that their theories are shaky, such watchdogs as warn against the aberrations of memory have the merit of demonstrating the partisanship and double standards of militants who, under an ideological or an ethnic banner, sabotage an 'ideal ethic of all'—one of fair play, rather than necessarily one of standards, which by their very nature are open to dispute.[23]

To the promoters of the two categories of militancy involved in strategies of anti-Semitisation and Russophobisation may be added those dedicated to condemning the crimes of communism. A number of leading so-called left-wing authors on totalitarianism were dissidents, taking from the very start a militant position, and a number of researchers of communism fervently published the truth that they identified before theoretical knowledge became militancy. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn assigned as much importance to empirical investigation as he did to raising awareness. Václav Havel extended his appeals against communism into an elaborate moral philosophy. Among such researchers, Stéphane Courtois, the editor of *The Black Book of Communism*, joined in civic action as an expert, while another author representative of this trend, essayist Thierry Wolton, developed his surveys of communism according to the logic of a case for the prosecution.[24] The combination of research and militancy is acceptable, even desirable, so long as ideological, ethnic, or any other kind of loyalties do not affect epistemological deontology.[25] In this work, I have focused on anti-Semitisation and Russophobisation given that they are the main directions from which the politics of memory is distorted, within the stylistics of hypocrisy, and given that they have a worldwide reach.

The Weak Points of the Treaty for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

Activist theories and the counter-theories that other agents of memory bring to bear against them take as their central reference the particularity of acts of genocide. The fourth chapter of this work takes as its subject the 'primordial flaw' that was the truncation of the Treaty for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by removal of political genocide from the list of international crimes. The treaty was adopted in a highly volatile context, which allowed the Soviet delegation to impose theses drawn up under the direct supervision of Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin. By mid-summer 1948, a window had opened for the inclusion of political communities among the groups protected by the Treaty. The Communist Bloc, supported by Egypt and a number of Latin American states, managed to close that window, however.

Theorists and activists have put forward concepts that delineate a much wider map of phenomena analogous to genocide: politicide, classicide, democide. I interpret these specific terms as a 'linguistic backlash' that does not make up for the lack of international guarantees against the atrocities to which large human communities have fallen victim, communities identified otherwise than racially, ethnically, nationally, or religiously. After the adoption of the Treaty in 1948, the number of political genocides was four times larger than genocides as defined by the criteria of the Treaty.

Chapter Four highlights the jurisprudence of the international courts that conduct trials against those accused of genocide. The International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia classed the massacre of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims as genocide taking as its argument the strategic and symbolic value of Srebrenica. The judges convicted Radislav Krstić, the army commander responsible for the massacres, of acts perpetrated with the intention of *destroying in part* a protected group, the part in question being *significant enough* to have an impact on the group as a whole. Such considerations are relevant to controversies beyond the Court. Among other things, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia provides arguments for the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide: the extermination of national élites and the death under appalling conditions of millions of Ukrainians from 1930 to 1933, at the orders of Stalin. The Ukrainian national movement represented an obstacle in the path of the Russification and centralisation of the U.S.S.R.

The Holodomor and other large-scale collective crimes have not been brought before any international court. Contestation of the genocidal nature of the Holodomor seems to represent unusually high stakes for militants sensitive to equation of 'far-right' and 'far-left' crimes. But the part played by ideology should not be exaggerated. Indifference, negotiation of interests, and threats are also effective factors of power in the construction of memory. No international court has ruled that the Turkish State committed ('far-right'-type) genocide against the Armenians during the First World War. This explains why Turkey has been successful in its efforts to block broader recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

Comparativism

The subject of conflicting narratives of memory constantly comes back to the question of interpreting history from a comparative standpoint. Symmetrically with the well-worn argument of 'trivialisation through comparison', I have developed a concept of 'trivialisation through rejection of comparison'. Such a pair of concepts, which mirror each other, might breathe new life into a debate which otherwise seems to have exhausted its arguments. The notion of 'trivialisation through rejection of comparison' constitutes a component of the methodological comparativism sustained in this work, i.e., systematic and conscious recourse to comparison of memory narratives and the historical events that motivate them. Comparison is one of the paths along which the ethics of memory is brought to the forefront of constructing collective memories.

Methodological comparativism turns the systematic use of comparison into a tool for logical analysis, a heuristic source and an ethical resource. *Consistent* recourse to comparison in order to articulate ethical judgements is frequently to be found in the literature. A considerable number of books and studies have turned the comparison between fascism and communism (between Nazism and Stalinism, or between Russia and Germany from 1914 to 1945[26]) into a secondary discipline in its own right. These books and studies reach ethical assessments, which are hard to avoid even when their authors aim to produce purely historical research, such as would be a purely 'technical' examination of the conduct of the different armies that fought in the Second World War.

The comparativist methodology does not presuppose treating the major historical genocides and democides as 'equal' or equivalent to each other. Nor does it aim to seek evidence in support of such a thesis. The multi-causality and multi-dimensionality of such phenomena does not permit 'equalisation'. In particular, although the forms of violence committed by fascist and communist régimes provide many analogies, each has its own unmistakable mark. On the other hand, the question of whether or not the major crimes are *morally equivalent* is legitimate and grounded, and inherent to an ethics of memory. Within a humanist approach to the ethics of memory, the criteria that legitimise the manifestation of cruelty in human communities are quite simply damnable.

The comparative methodology was driven by the need to take responsibility for transparency when making comparisons. The logical and ethical rigours it entails circumscribe the sphere in which comparison is appropriate and those cases where it serves no purpose. Cordoning off an 'area free of comparativism' goes hand in hand with acknowledging the fact that *certain horrors are absolute and cannot be compared.* This constitutes the subject of the investigations, of contemplation and of remembering. It is quite simply improper to divert attention, by relativising them, from the tragedies of the human beings fed into the crematoria at Auschwitz, Belzec, Chelmno, Majdanek, Treblinka and Sobibo, from the cruelties that led to the pyramids of skulls built by the Khmer Rouge and the immeasurable suffering of the children of Cambodia, from the sadism of the torturers of China or the Pitești Experiment.[27]

Conceptual Aspects

Totalitarianism. I frequently use the word 'totalitarianism' in this book. It was 'demanded' by the current usage of the concept in the literature that deals with questions of collective memory. The resolutions of the Council of Europe, O.S.C.E., and the European Union have made the two major criminal régimes of the twentieth century synonymous with 'totalitarianism'. I regard the concept to be useful within an overview of analytic contexts, including the present book, and within the field of macro-politics more generally. I am here thinking of the concept of 'totalitarianism' according to the six features listed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, which are easy to grasp and useful, and relevant up to a point. I have taken account of the fact that Michael Halberstam ironically dubbed them the 'infamous six features of totalitarianism.'[28] I refer to totalitarianism above all by what it denotes rather than by what it connotes.

Confinement within the concept of totalitarianism in the investigation of the ethics and politics of memory would impoverish the field. Particularly in microhistory, 'it has been observed that the totalitarian model—with its claim to describe a monolithic, efficient state possessing a dogmatic ideology that alters the mind—does not describe and even less so explains the historical reality.'[29] Micro-historical research into the Nazi period has lent memory of the Holocaust a depth long since overshadowed by the narrative of huge numbers.[30] Microhistory is especially relevant to the ethics of memory because it has access to the complexity of the 'boundary between good and evil.'[31] From the viewpoint of some authors, interpretation of communism as a régime of totalitarian control has led to a 'confrontation, to a schism' with 'the experience of everyday "lived experience".'[32] Socio-political theories of collective action and institutional analysis likewise highlight a complexity in how authoritarian régimes function that does not lend itself to the concept of totalitarianism.[33]

I appreciate that the concept of 'totalitarianism', with its emphasis on repression and mind-altering ideology, on inner and outward domination, has numerous limitations when it comes to describing the criminal authoritarian régimes of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, in certain contexts, it can be productive.

Unlike Nazism, which, as a state power, was meteoric in its rise and fall, communism affected multiple generations, imbuing people's entire existence. The communist régimes added the difficulty (albeit one that is not exclusive to them[34]) that 'after a given point' it is not possible to trace a clear boundary between victims and executioners. Exemplary in this respect have been the failures of 'moral lustration' when it comes to passing sentence on collaborators. A rudimentary interpretation of such a problematic led to Adam Hradílek, the head of the Oral History Department of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Régimes, labelling Milan Kundera as a 'collaborator', and likewise to the accusation that Lech Wałęsa was a 'communist informer'.[35] I shall return to the cases of Kundera and Wałęsa, but I shall look most closely at the phenomenon of unmasking collaborators in Romania, which is an exemplary case study in the problematics of memory.

There are at least two distinct periods in the history of the communist régimes, from which Democratic Kampuchea and North Korea stand out as exceptions. More often than not, a 'Stalinist' and a 'post-Stalinist' period are referred to. In the present work, wherever I have not limited myself to the specialist debate, I refer to the 'democidal period' rather than 'Stalinism'. I appreciate that there were likewise two periods in the history of Nazism: prior and subsequent to the Waansee Conference of 20 January 1942, when the 'Final Solution to the Jewish problem' was established. I have used the term 'democidal phenomena' to refer to both genocides properly speaking and to politicide and classicide.

Ideologies and Left- and Right-wing Ideological Régimes

In the present work, I refer to left- and right-wing extremism, to leftist and fascist organisations, to the radical left and right, or more simply, to 'the left' and 'the right'. The reason is the same as that for embracing the concept of totalitarianism: the left/right dichotomy permeates the political discourses, analyses and documents relevant to collective memories. In particular, international judicial bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union Court of Justice try criminal cases involving left- and right-wing political identities, and their rulings adopt those labels, thereby reinforcing them. 'Left and right' is not my conceptual tool, but rather the object of my analysis; it is about 'left and right' rather than deriving therefrom.

Otherwise, I appreciate that the alignment of ideologies and political practices along a left-right axis does not stand up to the examination of a mature theory of social phenomena. As Crispin Sartwell puts it: the left-right axis 'is conceptually confusing, ideologically tendentious and historically contingent. And any position along it is rife with contradictions.'[36]

Antisemitism. In the debate on the subject of antisemitism, the 'new antisemitism', and corollary topics, I support the classic definition: antisemitism is hatred of Jews. This millennial hatred reached an extreme in the extermination carried out by the Nazis. I have taken note of the observation that Nazi antisemitism acquired the form of an amended Darwinism: 'The old concept of hereditary guilt was replaced with the even more perfidious concept of genetic guilt. The imaginary creation of a negative race, the Jewish race, is counterbalanced by the mythic vision of a German community invested with a mission to restore the Nordic race and Aryan blood.'[37]

Arab and Palestinian antisemitism have separate sources. I have referred to this specific category without going deeper into the subject, which has indirect relevance to the subject of the globalisation of hypocrisy and the humanist approach to the ethics of memory.

Humanism. The humanist attitude is in solidarity with the recognition of how primordial human sentiments are to progress towards a society of equality and liberty. The humanist ideal is a pragmatic project.[38] While arguing for the contingency of social phenomena and acknowledging the part played by individuals and activism motivated by identity, humanism is at

the same time critical of the idea that certain persons and groups might have access to truth as a result of their ethnic-cultural or socio-political identity.

These are the theses of authors who have nurtured the 'type of humanism' embraced in this research. The principal philosophical tradition that I have taken as my guide sees cruelty as the worst of vices: Montaigne ('I hate cruelty, for it is the worst vice'), Hume ('angry passions rise up to cruelty, they form the most detested of all vices'), and others who have followed them in using similar language.[39] The subject has become the hallmark of American liberalism thanks to Judith Shklar: 'It seems to me that liberal and humane people, of whom there are many among us, would, if they were asked to rank the vices, put cruelty first. Intuitively they would choose cruelty as the worst thing we do.'[40] Richard Rorty was to reiterate Shklar's message, identifying liberals as those who believe 'cruelty is the worst thing we do.'[41]

I unreservedly embrace this attitude towards cruelty as the first principle of humanism, but not its 'definitional' association with the liberal community (in the American sense). Humanism is nurtured by multiple resources, thinkers and fields, among the last of which literature holds a high place. Richard Rorty's argument for wagering on literature in the face of the major topics that we deem to belong to 'Philosophy' served as a background to the moral questioning found in the final chapter of this book. When I sensed that reason's power to guide ethical judgement was on the verge of exhaustion, I drew on Alain Finkielkraut's invocation of literature for its ability to 'rescue the real world from cursory readings'.[42]

References to the Second World War

The subject matter of this book demanded references to the history of the Second World War. I have gone through the books on the conflict from the perspective of a researcher in the normative sciences. I have 'borrowed' from the historians those narratives in which they showed themselves to be receptive to the complexity of the determining causes capable of explaining clashes and crimes of such proportions. I have taken note of A. J. P. Taylor's observation, key to understanding the War, that the great powers conduct themselves according to their own interests and depending on the opportunities provided by their interactions with other great powers, regardless of whether they be led by cruel fanatics or by democrats.[43] I have followed Norman Davies in his effort to reach an honest understanding of history: 'Like must be compared with like; proportions must be observed; and standards of judgement that are applied to one party in the conflict must be applied even-handedly to all parties in the conflict.'[44] Timothy Snyder's works were a guide to interpreting apocalyptic crimes in their contexts (particularly their geographic contexts) and therefore their interaction.[45] I made use of Sean McMeekin's *Stalin's War* (2021) for the emphasis it places on the wider context of events, on their systematic integration and on achieving a level of detail in research (subject to archival proof) that prevents ideological adjustments to any portrait of the Second World War.[46] It is a portrait of how two evils with ambitions to world domination worked together before colliding in a life-or-death struggle, at the end of which one of them, communism, emerged triumphant. *Stalin's War* is also

important to the demystification of the West's plans of action. Not only were leaders of Britain and the United States influenced by Soviet spies, but also they made huge errors in judgement—what McMeekin calls 'western ineptitude'—as a result of their lack of strategic vision.[47] The historians I have quoted demonstrate that below a certain threshold of comprehensiveness, simultaneous with gaps in detail, description of past genocidal events tends towards partisanship. A deconstruction of partisanship is one of the aims of this book.

Honest Research, an Attribute of the Humanist Paradigm

One research challenge was to interpret correctly the relevant narratives brought into conflict by some authors. The obligation to take an honest stance is all the more obvious in a book on the ethics of memory and, in particular, one intended to promote a humanist approach to such an ethics. *Honesty is an essential attribute of humanist understanding*. To be correct and therefore honest does not imply equality among subject matter, a demand so ill-adapted to the logic of research, which is by definition selective. To impose such an equality is sooner a critical pretext.

Raising the issue here, I have in mind Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe's criticism of Timothy Snyder's *The Bloodlands* and other similar instances. According to Rossoliński-Liebe, the American historian gave more attention to the Ukrainian famine of 1933-34 and the Soviet massacre of Polish prisoners of war at Katyń than to the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1941 or the German liquidation of Soviet prisoners of war.[48] A researcher's priorities reflect professional contingencies and are not susceptible to standardisation: Snyder wanted to highlight events that had been granted too little attention, or which had not been highlighted within his own academic context, or to put forward original findings.[49] Four years after *The Bloodlands*, Snyder published *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning* (2015). Nota bene, the emphases and feeling were here focused on other categories of event—on the forms of ethnic and political terror invoked by Rossoliński-Liebe.

In my own research, focused on the asymmetry of memories, which I perceive as the expression of an 'insufficiently humanist' attitude, selection was inherently intended to balance the scales of memory. In this respect, I ascribe to the viewpoint of Alain Besançon, who, documenting amnesia of Communist crimes in comparison with hypermnesia of Nazi crimes, aspires to 'a simple and just memory' sufficient to condemn both cataclysms.[50]

How Far Analyses Can Be Extended away from the Main Topic

A few thematic forays may give the impression of straying from the subject of the globalisation of hypocrisy through application of ideologised and ethnicised ethics. Analysis of the subject of citizenship in Lativa might be accused of this, and likewise the explanations motivating the analogy with Turkish legislation on the wearing of the veil on state premises before the changes made by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

For Latvians, citizenship is an essential ingredient in the construction of collective memory. Establishing citizenship after the gaining of independence defines 'a certain type' of

connection with the past, with inter-war Latvia, simultaneous with an appreciation of what recent history meant in the period of Sovietisation. National reconstruction was conceived as a return to roots, involving a rejection of passive 'alteration through Russification' in the communist period. At the same time, national reconstruction is demanded to be ethical, which entails respect for human rights regardless of whether or not the inhabitants of Latvia are of Latvian origin. I deemed it vital that the present work provide an answer to any eventual doubts.

Analogously, I have analysed the decades-long pressure on Israel exerted by the Intifada, which is a subject in its own right. I have described the indulgent attitude of symbolically important organisations such as Amnesty International and Save the Children towards the use of children as human shields and terrorists by Palestinian factions within an educational atmosphere of war propaganda, since without taking such actions into account we would not be able to understand the virulence with which Israel treats subjects of memory.

A Topic Absent from but Relevant to the Problematics of Memory: Free Speech

The increased interest in the problematics of memory in recent decades has coincided with an erosion of the value of free speech in the present-day democratic world, which has a direct impact on the way in which history and memory are discussed, public policy is planned, and ethical questions are raised. In particular, the European approach to free speech allows politicians and social movements to turn the ban on unpleasant symbols and discourses into an end in itself.[51] In the America of the First Amendment, exaggerated political correctness undermines institutions fundamental to the exercise of freedom, such as universities and the press.[52] Movements to combat anti-Semitism and racism have created the legal and cultural space that allows leading figures to be removed from universities for using stereotypes, even positive ones;[53] or editors to be sacked for publishing articles that question what the majority of editors deem to be self-evident.[54]

Few topics are closer to that of how 'hypocrisy' manifests itself in the debate on memory than free speech. Opportunistic behaviour, which distorts the sphere of opinion, leads to institutional practices for managing incoherent, disproportionate and unpredictable public regulations and policies. Hypocrisy and opportunism have come to be systemic.[55] In the present work, frequent references are made to free speech and its impact on the construction of memory. Although it would have been tempting I have not given the subject a separate chapter or subchapter, such as an analysis of the 'laws of memory' from the standpoint of free speech. What remains unexplored in particular is the impact of freedom of speech on freedom of thought, the latter having to do with the world of nuances and complexity, which are themselves central to the humanist viewpoint.

The approach to 'hypocrisy in the debate on memory' from the standpoint of free speech would have brought to bear a paradigm far removed from that put forward in this book and

would have diminished it. Here, the topic of free speech can be found in the analysis of militant theories and the problematics of negationism, but without going further into the topic in such cases.

Another Topic Absent but Relevant: The Supposition of Omniscience on the Part of Subjects to whom Ethical Judgement is Applied

It is surprising how little attention has been paid to how much those who make pronouncements, some of them apologetic, about the two totalitarian régimes and their leaders actually know about the realities thereof. How much time could the busy scientists such as Rudolf Carnap and Albert Einstein who expressed sympathies towards Soviet leaders have had to find out about the atrocious crimes committed in the Soviet Union? Obviously, those crimes were reported in the press, but in the first half of the twentieth century they were not a mainstream subject in the United States.

Did the intellectuals who wrote articles for the *Daily Worker* know that the Communist Part of the United States was funded by the U.S.S.R. and took orders from the Kremlin? It was to be suspected, but evidence emerged only later. Did the people who greeted Nazi troops with bread and salt realise Hitler's genocidal plans? The fate of Belorussians and Ukrainians under Nazi occupation shows that they did not. Did the leaders involved in the fight against the imperialist plans launched by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact have access to the information required for them to follow a wise strategy? The plan General Wladyslaw Sikorski sent to the British on 19 June 1940 to create an army of trained Poles under Soviet occupation had been a phantasm. The around twenty-two thousand five hundred officers, highly trained technicians, priests, and élite civil servants on whom Skorski was counting had been executed on Stalin's orders in the spring of that year (the Katyn massacre).

When they joined the Axis in 1940, did the governments under Soviet threat (Romania, Bulgaria) and their populations have any knowledge of the massacres against the Jews and the fact that the Nazi labour camps were extermination camps? The first documents on the plans to exterminate the Jews reached the leaders of the Allies in March 1942. In autumn that year, the reports of eye witnesses that were brought to London by courier were simply not believed.[56] Today the mainstream position of the ethics and politics of memory in the West is to identify Romania and Bulgaria's joining of the Tripartite Pact as acceptance to take part in the Final Solution. For this reason, 'allying with Nazi Germany' during the Second World War constitutes a stigma in itself. But the series of events does not allow for such an interpretation. It expresses a vision constructed many decades after the event. Moreover, the countries' leaders were executed at the end of the Second World War, the principal charge against them having been their entry into the war against the U.S.S.R.[57]

It is common for many people, including decision-makers, to pass judgement on subjects about which they have only partial information. The debate that holds people morally responsible for their actions all too often unfolds as if they were omniscient. Not only is it possible that at the time the people thus 'judged' may not have had the information on which their actions ethically depended, but also when such information did reach them, it was filtered by an environment that may even have contested, relativized, or marginalised it in relation to other information. How lucid can you remain in a university environment where the relationship between people 'more to the left' and 'more to the right' politically falls within a ratio of between thirty and fifty to one (the case of the University of California in 2013-14)?

The overwhelming part played by information and environment in people's ethical choices is supported by the example of those former communists who 'woke up', such as Alain Besançon, François Furet and Arthur Koestler, and went on to become theorists of anticommunism. Their example shines the light on yet another factor: the time needed by a human being to meditate on good and on life before finally gaining ethical discernment. Collective memory rests on generations-long meditation.

Testing the ethical judgements of the entrepreneurs of memory in the mirror of the supposition of their subjects' omniscience would be an educational exercise. Such an exercise exceeded the possibilities of the research I conducted, however.

For a Humanist Approach to the Ethics of Memory

The politics of memory and the narratives on which they are founded implies an ethics of memory, and this finds ideological, ethnic or humanist legitimacy. In my argument for a humanist approach to the ethics and politics of memory, I have employed criteria such as coherence of ethical stance, standards of historical truth, and authenticity of ethical truth in opposition to the refusal to recognise the humanity of the victims and to the downgrading of the universality of suffering. In the context of the problematics of memory, thinking in terms of morality and ethics needs to take into account the complexity and contingency of historical phenomena.

One challenge to the humanist position towards history is moral aporias. I have examined interpretations relating to Bulgaria's responsibility for the deportation of Jews during the Second World War, the 'ontological' abolition of scientific figures with extreme anti-Semitic views, the lack of consensus among historians, writers, polemicists, and international agents of memory with regard to Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera.

The humanist approach to the ethics of memory is confronted with the judicialisation of memory. One sensitive topic is how to treat the rulings of the courts that followed Stalin's orders in the territories conquered by the Red Army at the end of the Second World War. (Treatment of the courts that followed Hitler's orders is not a sensitive issue.) A viable juridical perspective

demands a detailed command of the contexts, which explains why I chose to examine the situation in Romania. In particular, since 1990, I have looked at the denial of the right to a fair trial for those convicted by courts in communist Romania.

The final chapter dedicates a number of pages to the battle for memory in the United States, further radicalised in 2020 by the Black Lives Matter (B.L.M.) movement. The clarity and intensity of the racial/ethnic and ideological partisanship of U.S. protestors was relevant to the broader theme of memory. One 'gift' of examination of the B.L.M. movement is the concept of symbolic non-applicability of any statute of limitations relative to the principles of civilised nations, in the wake of the principle of crimes imprescriptible under international law. Another, highly telling particularity of the battle for memory to which B.L.M. gave rise has been the abrupt rejection on the part of the militants of any historical determinism that might shape the human condition. The 'battle for memory', which reached its militant, radical peak in 2020 in the United States, provided fresh arguments for the essentially contingent nature of ethical-political phenomena.

The search for a wiser path in the turbulent U.S. context provided a good ethical exercise; it highlighted the value of caution, discernment, and proportionality when judging actions from the past. The tearing down statues in the U.S. likewise points to concept of civilised principles on which there is no statute of limitations, the same as the principle of imprescriptible crimes under international law. The U.S. case is nonetheless limited and sometimes even parochial in relation to the fundamental topics of the ethics of memory. It would be hard to identify moral aporias and contradictions or epistemological dilemmas arising from the B.L.M. movement. But difficulties of inclusion and of passing judgement in problematic cases are what most stimulate ethical thinking.[58]

The concept of a 'humanist approach to the ethics of memory' and the research behind it took as their reference Avishai Margalit's *The Ethics of Memory*. Notwithstanding, in my considerations regarding a humanist approach to ethics, I did not feel the need to rely on Margalit's theory. The reason for this is the different ways in which as we each circumscribe the empirical underpinnings of our research and its references to authorities. For Margalit, 'an example taken from a work of fiction can make my point just as well as an example taken from a work of history.' Although it has its advantages, such a paradigm encourages speculation and confines itself to categories.[59] In my own work, ethical thinking takes as its principal methodological options: (a) detailing of the facts until they provide a coherent overall picture, and (b) dialogue with the rational approach of Law, the latter providing a plentiful store of collectively agreed upon meditation on what should serve as the norm. Detail and technicality individualise and therefore humanise meditation.

Contextualisation by Individual State

It has been suggested that typologies be drawn up to describe the attitudes of the post-communist states towards their own communist past, which also determine their participation in international debates on memory, typologies that would include: 'clear anti-communist consensus', 'controversial interpretation of communism', and 'ambivalence or indifference towards the Stalinist and post-Stalinist past'.

Such classifications can be useful in certain contexts, but in others they overshadow the most interesting part of post-communist memory, the highly complex interaction between the actors involved in the construction of collective memory. Understanding the phenomenon of memory is impossible without a detailed investigation of the national realities both overall and in detail. This explains why towards the end this book makes more and more references to the Romanian case. To the author's biographical determinants can be added the fact that the problematics of ethics and the politics of memory in Romania is to a certain extent exceptional. In no other European country under Soviet hegemony did the communist and the political élite (the Securitate) inflict such painful privations on the population in the final years of the régime.[60] In no other communist state did liberation from dictatorship occur by means of a bloody revolt like that of the December 1989 Revolution.

After the fall of the Ceaușescu régime, a population frustrated by communism and hundreds of thousands of former political prisoners were forced to live under the rule of those responsible for their previous suffering. The government was occupied by the second tier of the former nomenklatura and former officers of the Securitate, who also came to control the main economic resources. With the exception of the top leaders, the former political police occupied the intelligence services of the state, which had embarked on radical democratic construction. All these facts, as well as others, explain why in Romania the subject of memory has been not only defended, but also manipulated with exceptional intensity.

Nor did salvaging the memory of the other genocide, the Holocaust, unfold simply. The authoritarian state ruled by General Ion Antonescu was directly responsible for the deaths of more than a quarter of a million Jews outside Romania's historical territory (in Transnistria) during the Second World War.[61] But at the same time, the Antonescu Government refused to deport hundreds of thousands of Jews from Romania, despite German pressure. During communism, a large part of Romania's Jews emigrated from Romania, some of them being quite simply sold for hard currency.[62] Until after the fall of the régime, public debate about the Holocaust in Romania could not take place. Its memory was preserved in families of Jews. After the Revolution, for a time little was said about the Holocaust. It would take many years before the trauma of the Jews during the Second World War became a central theme of the politics of memory in Romania.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the upper echelons of the new régime, drawn from the former communist élite, and the militants of Holocaust memory came to work together. There had been ideologically motivated relations between the leaders of the two categories since before

the fall of communism. This alliance of opportunity had wide-ranging, unpredictable, and long-term consequences. Since the 2010s, the politics of combatting anti-Semitism and promoting the memory of the Holocaust has become the prime factor for trivialising the crimes of communism, a paradox peculiar to the ethics of memory in Romania. The public politics that sustains the memory of the Holocaust also dominates qualitatively, not just quantitatively, the politics aimed at remembering the horrors of communism.[63]

Conclusions

One of the conclusions of this examination of the globalisation of hypocrisy from the standpoint of a humanist ethics of memory in opposition to the ethnic and ideological mainstream is how valuable it is to exercise caution when embracing an ideal of remembrance. The politics of memory has come to be hypertrophied. It comes into conflict with the major principles that benefit political communities, to the point where it has turned into a 'tyranny of memory',[64] while at the same time the 'ceaseless appeals for us to remember' have proven sterile.[65] David Rieff has pursued this idea as far as the following radical position: 'Far from political remembrance being always a moral imperative, then, there will be times when such remembrance is what stands in the way' and 'We could legitimately go farther and assert that the world would be a better place if, instead of being convinced that collective memory (…) should be a moral imperative for us, we instead chose to forget.'[66]

Rieff's idea draws a distinction between 'always' and 'sometimes'. Forgetting is no longer possible or useful. Human life can be led decently only in an 'ethical' society. As it is ethical, this necessarily implies an 'ethics of memory'. Such a decent life demands that when collective memory is brought to bear it should not overshadow the interest in a free future.

Another, sooner sceptical, conclusion regards the creation of 'grand narratives' and policies of universal memory that might provide explanations, standards and guidelines for national memory. The contradictions, paradoxes, excesses and cacophony of collective memories of the totalitarian past shows that after a given point, attempts to standardise memory favour highly partisan, ideologically and ethnically charged choices. The construction of a 'universal ethics' of memory in the shadow of such kinds of excess can have depressing consequences.

Finally, I return to the subject that provided my starting point: the asymmetrical construction of politics of collective memory in relation to criminal events in human history. Although cannot be claimed down to the level of detail (to take one example, the Nazi swastika is not equivalent to the communist star, according to a solidly argued European Court of Human Rights decision, which I agree with), the aspiration towards a symmetrically functioning memory seems a sine qua non for maintaining the ethical ideal of collective memories.

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[1] Claus Leggewie, 'Seven circles of European memory', in Peter Meusburger, Michael Hefferman, Edgar Wurden (eds.), *Cultural Memories. The Geographical Point of View*, Springer, Dordrech Heilderbeg 2011, pp. 123-145.

[2] By analogy with the situation of nations, communities that share memory and forgetting (Ernest Renan). The argument would be that in general, 'collective identities require both a common goal for the future and common

points of reference in the past, and 'this applies also to the case of the European Union (Aleida Assmann, 'EUROPE: A COMMUNITY OF MEMORY?', Twentieth Annual Lecture of the GHI, 16 November 2006 - *GHI Bulletin* no. 40 (Spring 2007), p. 12). Given memory is constructed by associating meaningful events ('collective identities require both a common goal for the future and common points of reference in the past collective identities require both a common goal for the future and common points of reference in the past'), a European memory is possible only through the generalisation of shared meanings at a Europe-wide level. See Lydia Polgreen, 'How Will History Remember Jan. 6?' *The New York Times*, 19 December 2022 - https://nyti.ms/3Kwvpaw).

[3] An example of a 'community of memory' within the European Union: the informal group of members of European Parliament known as 'Reconciliation of European Histories'. The group has taken on the task of 'the true reunification of European history based on truth and memory', arguing that such a reunification has yet to be achieved. From the vast literature on the subject, I here cite Harald Wydra, who argues that there is a 'deep asymmetry in master narratives in political societies across the former Iron Curtain': 'In Western Europe, the politics of official apologies and regret have progressively instrumentalised the 'duty to remember' into political strategies of governing by looking back. Such practices rely not only on moral judgements about the nature of totalitarian regimes and the impact of genocide, but also on practices of transitional justice and policies of compensation, rehabilitation, and the political recognition of collective belonging to the citizenship of minority groups or former victims." On the other side of the former Iron Curtain, "Conversely, post-communist Eastern Europe has been characterized by divided memories and systematic attempts at historical revisionism, in which nationhood is rewritten as a constant and finally successful struggle against foreign domination. The temptation is great to see contested memories in Eastern Europe as pathological, a continuing nightmare from which it is difficult to awake. Arguments about the incapacity and immaturity to deal with the past abound. The question, however, is whether such claims are intellectually sound and historically tenable' (Harald Wydra, 'The Dynamics of Memory in East and West: Elements of a Comparative Framework,' *Studies in 20th century European History* No.1, December 2012 - https://bit.ly/43Y0A5m). Conny Mithander gives as an example the obvious asymmetry in Swedish memory politics to be found in information campaigns about the crimes of Communism and Nazism, including the education campaign (Conny Mithander, 'FROM THE HOLOCAUST TO THE GULAG: THE CRIMES OF NAZISM AND COMMUNISM IN SWEDISH POST-89 MEMORY POLITICS,' *European Cultural Memory Post-89*, 2013, pp. 177–208).

[4] The thesis is discussed at greater length in Chapter 7. One difficulty in creating a 'a new shared European memory' seems to be the major part Russia plays in discourses that invoke national memory: 'Since France, Germany and Poland had radically different relations with Russia in the twentieth century, we can expect Russia's representation in their national memory discourses to differ significantly. This creates a significant obstacle in the path of creating a shared European memory of the last century, given that it would be necessary to reconcile national memories in the representation of this key actor.' (Marco Siddi, 'Rusia și falsificarea memoriei și identității în Europa", *Studia Diplomatica*, LXV-4, 2012, p. 78 - https://bit.ly/3OLK0QP.)

[5] The term used by Heidemarie Uhl, 'Holocaust Memory and the Logic of Comparison,' in *Remembrance and Solidarity Studies in 20th-century European history*, No. 6, 2016, p. 246 - https://enrs.eu/uploads/media/5c24d1cb10e15-studies5-holocaust.pdf.

[6] On the danger of creating uniformity in the textbooks, with the aim of providing a universal interpretation of history, for example in the form of a shared European textbook, see Łukasz Kamiński, 'ENRS Report:European Remembrance. First Symposium of European Institutions Dealing with 20th Century History", 18 August 2012 - https://bit.ly/45l1Ss5. With regard to striking a balance between the various interpretations and historical accuracy, Norman Davies observes: 'It is unavoidable that historians come up with different interpretations, or at least with different points of emphasis. No narrative is ever going to win universal approval, however homogenized. Yet precautions can be taken against the grosser forms of inaccuracy. Like must be compared with like; proportions must be observed; and standards of judgement that are applied to one party in the conflict must be applied even-handedly to all parties in the conflict.' (Norman Davies, *No simple Victory. World War II in Europe, 1939-1945*, Viking, New York, 2006, pp. 11-12.)

[7] On this point, Richard Ned Lebow argues the following: 'The politics of memory describes a process that involves large numbers of actors some of them private individuals, some government officials. These actor-have access to a wide range of resources and mobilize them to achieve goal that may be discrete or quite diffuse. They act in a political and cultural setting where other influences, many of them unpredictable or unforeseen, help shape the consequences of their behavior and the ways in which debates evolve. Such a complex and open-ended process may produce short- and long-term outcomes at odds with the expectations of key actors, as happened when efforts in the

FRG to foster a particular view of the past to win the support or German expellees established a cognitive framework that had profound and unanticipated implications for future policy toward the German Democratic Republic. In France, General de Gaulle's postliberation decision to remain silent about the role of Vichy and to nationalize the resistance likewise had unexpected outcomes…' (Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe', in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu, *The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2006, p. 26).

[8] Henry Rousso, 'Vers une mondialisation de la mémoire', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 2007/2 (No 94), pp. 3-10 - https://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=VING_094_0003.

[9] As Matthias Haß puts it: 'History is never only about the past. It is also an image that people create based on the present reality in which they live.' (Matthias Haß, 'The Politics of Memory in Germany, Israel and the United States of America,' Working Paper Series Number 10, York University, 2004, p. 2).

[10] The nature of memory as a construct was highlighted before the concept in question came to dominate the social sciences as a whole; see in particular Maurice Halbwachs' landmark work, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris, *Les Travaux de L'Année Sociologique*, F. Alcan, Paris, 1925 (*On collective memory*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992). The term 'memory entrepreneurs' applies to that category of person who creates shared references to a painful past and ensures respect by appealingto historical responsibility, shared memory, and legal accountability (Michael Pollak, *Une identité blessée. Études de sociologie et d'histoire*, Éditions Métailié, Paris, 1993).

[11] I have adopted the term used by David Rieff (*In Praise of Forgetting. Historical Memory and Its Ironies,* Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2016). For a comparison with the speed of 'memory production' today, it should be pointed out that Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews* was published in 1961 by a small press in the United States after a six-year wait. In 1967, a German edition of the book was rejected by Rowohlt Verlag.

[12] The categories of collective memory relevant to the ethics of memory:

- 'national memory', a specific form of cultural memory that contributes to national group cohesion (John R Gillis, *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996; Geoffrey M. White, 'Emotional Remembering: The Pragmatics of National Memory', *Ethos.* 27 (4), December 1999, pp. 505–529);
- 'geopolitical memory' (Tatiana Zhurzhenko, 'Concluding Remarks: The Geopolitics of Memory', in Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (ed.), *Broken Narratives. Post-Cold War History and Identity in Europe and East Asia*, Leiden Series in Comparative Historiography, Brill, 2014; Eurozine focal point 'European histories. Towards a grand narrative?' - www.eurozine.com/comp/focalpoints/eurohistories.html);
- 'universal memory', in the sense of (i) 'people understand similar things when they use the same words', as in 'the struggle to define the Holocaust' (Matthias Haß, 'The Politics of Memory in Germany, Israel and the United States of America,' Working Paper Series Number 10, York University, 2004, pp. 1-2), or (ii) 'a globally significant *lieu de mémoire*' such as 1 September 1939, 'the date with the strongest symbolism for the 20th century' (Stefan Troebst, '23 August: The Genesis of a Euroatlantic Day of Remembrance,' European Network Remembrance and Solidarity**,** 15 August 2012 - https://enrs.eu/article/23-august-the-genesis-of-a-euroatlantic-day-of-remembrance);
- 'conflicted memories' (Konrad Hugo Jarausch, Thomas Lindenberger, Annelie Ramsbrock (eds.), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories*. Studies in Contemporary European History Series, Berghahn Books, New York, 2007);
- 'divided memories' or 'divergent memories' and 'rival narratives of memory' (on the problematics of national memories in Asia, extensive joint research has been carried out under the auspices of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center/ Stanford University as part of the 'Divided Memories and Reconciliation' project: see Gi-Wook Shin, Daniel C. Sneider (eds.), *History Manuals and the Wars in Asia. Divided Memories*, Routledge Contemporary Asia, 2011; Gi-Wook Shin, Daniel C. Sneider, *Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War (Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center)*, Stanford University Press, 2016; likewise, Mikyoung Kim (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Memory and Reconciliation in East Asia*, Routledge, 2016.

[13] One principle of public policies demands that analogous situations be dealt with using similar measures, and different situations be dealt with using separate measures. It remains an open question how and to what extent this rule is transferable to the area of memory politics.

[14] This book makes extensive reference to European Union laws, resolutions and declarations with an impact on memory politics. With reference to programmes, see in particular the European Union and Council of Europe partnerships with the International Alliance for Holocaust Commemoration. The E.U. digital platform for European cultural resources includes a section called 'Judaica European' (https://judaica-europeana.eu/), a network of

archives, libraries and museums that work together to integrate and extend access to their digital collections, thereby keeping alive 'the memory of a people that has disappeared from certain parts of Europe.' The E.U. research framework programme supports the integration of European regional and national research infrastructure within a European infrastructure, including Holocaust research, such as the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (https://www.inshr-ew.ro/portfolio-item/european-holocaust-research-infrastructure/).

[15] Tzvetan Todorov, apud. David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting. Historical Memory and Its Ironies*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2016, p. 110.

[16] It was intrinsic that the term 'globalisation of hypocrisy' should also occur in other contexts. One example would be considerations of equality and justice at the international level (Paul Buchheit, 'The Globalization of Hypocrisy,' *Common Dreams*, 20 May 2013 - https://www.commondreams.org/views/2013/05/20/globalization-hypocrisy). 'Hypocrisy' also has more abstract meanings, for example, the result of shaping human nature through natural selection, which makes people 'selfish hypocrites so skilled at puting on a show of virtue that we fool even ourselves'. (Haidt, Jonathan, *The Righteous Mind. Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion?* Pantheon Books, New York, 2012). On the numerous references to hypocritical treatment of memory as a result of making distinctions between the victims of different totalitarian régimes, see Vytautas Landsbergis, 'Hypocrisy of discrimination among victims of totalitarian crimes,' in Peter Jambrek (ed.), *Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes. Crimes and other gross and large-scale human rights violations committed during the reign of totalitarian regimes in Europe: cross-national survey of crimes committed and of their remembrance, recognition, redress, and reconciliation.* Reports and proceedings of the 8 April European public hearing on 'Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes' (January – June 2008), pp. 85-87 - https://bit.ly/3QunG0g.

Differentiation between victims is in keeping with differentiation between perpetrators: 'Discrimination of victims is completed by that of killers. Perpetrators of crimes against humanity are treated discriminatingly alongside their nationality and ideology. (...) The same wrong tradition of discriminatory valuation and judiciary is exercised concerning the techniques used by the terminators.'. (Idem, p. 86).

[17] An example of how far stigmatic labelling in the name of anti-Semitism can go: on a panel about anti-Semitism held in Jerusalem in 2018, Jewish philanthropist George Soros was called 'a Nazi' (Nadine Epstein, 'The Vilification of George Soros In Israel,' *moment*, 24 January 2019 - https://www.momentmag.com/the-vilification-of-george-soros-in-israel/). See the equally absurd parallel of Kremlin labelling the American reaction to Russian election interference in 2016 as Russophobia. Likewise, Vladimir Putin and Russian propagandists for the invasion of Ukraine have labelled the Jewish Volodimir Zelenski a 'Nazi'.

[18] Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States of America, 'The Russiangate Hysteria: A case of Severe Russophobia', 18 April 2019 - https://washington.mid.ru/upload/iblock/3c3/3c3d1e3b69a4c228e99bfaeb5491ecd7.pdf.

[19] Maria Mälksoo has examined the complex function of the memory politics conducted by Poland and the Baltic States since they joined the European Union. These states oppose the 'basic European hegemonic narrative' while at the same time seeking recognition of the fact that they represent 'what Europe means'. (Maria Mälksoo, 'The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe,' *European Journal of International Relations*, November 12, 2009, p. 653). She draws a distinction between 'at least four major mnemonic communities in the European memory landscape in relation to World War II: Atlantic-Western European, German, East-Central European and Russian'. (Idem, p. 654).

Memory politics presents a far more heteroclite picture in former Communist countries such as Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. On 6 January 2023, Janez Zemljarič, the head of the Yugoslav National Security Service from 1975 to 1976, a period in which many opponents of the Yugoslav Communist régime were assassinated, was buried with military honours. Democrats from the S.D.S. opposition voiced outrage at this decision, 'which violates the fundamental right to human dignity and mocks the suffering of the many victims of the criminal activities of the National Security Service' (Sebastijan R. Maček, 'Communist-era leader buried with military honors in Slovenia stirs up controversy,' *EUROACTIV*, 9 January 2013 - https://bit.ly/3Ou4UDC).

[20] The German courts convicted Witzsch for negationist letters sent to private addresses, the first time to politicians, the second, to the author of an article criticising him (*Witzsch v. Germany*, 41448/98, Inadmissibility Decision, April 20, 1999; *Witzsch v. Germany*, 7485/03, Inadmissibility Decision, December 13, 2005 – see also Gabriel Andreescu, 'Interzicerea negării crimelor comuniste pe plan european: de la ideologie la drepturi fundamentale', in *Noua Revistă de Drepturile Omului* No. 1, 2011, pp. 41-61). A 2004 campaign conducted by PETA Deutschland, an organisation fighting cruelty to animals, was banned on the grounds that it damaged human dignity. Campaign posters had shown concentration camp prisoners alongside animals in factory farms. The images of the

concentration camps in fact expressed the horror and compassion that the campaign organisers wished to transfer to attitudes towards animals (broader commentary in Gabriel Andreescu, 'Liberalismul împotriva lui însuși', in Sorin Adam Matei, Caius Dobrescu, Emanuel Copilaș, *Liberalismul, pro și contra. O carte ce încearcă să conserve diversitatea de idei*, Adenium, Jassy, 2015, pp. 219-257). The German Parliament drafted and quickly passed a law blocking the effects of a decision by a court in Köln to condemn male circumcision following angry protest from Jewish communities. The court had cited a provision of the German Constitution banning irreversible alterations to the human body (for commentary from the perspective of legal pluralism, see Reut Yael Paz, 'The Circumcision Debate. The Cologne Circumcision Judgment: A Blow Against Liberal Legal Pluralism,' 24 July 2012 - https://bit.ly/3qvxVqu).

[21] See Ivan Kurilla, 'The Implications of Russia's Law against the Rehabilitation of Nazism', *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo* No. 331 - https://bit.ly/3QwoK3Q.

[22] In the six months after the law banning 'flagrant disrespect' for the authorities came into effect, 45 people were convicted, 26 of them for disrespect towards President Vladimir Putin ('Most Russians Charged for "Disrespecting" Authorities Insulted Putin – Rights Group,' *The Moscow Times*, 30 September 2019 - https://bit.ly/43UZzuU).

[23] In this context, see the idea of 'cynical theories' in Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay, *Cynical theories: how activist scholarship made everything about race, gender, and identity and why this harms everybody*, Pitchstone Publishing, Durham, 2020. The book has been criticised without any attempt to provide counterarguments.

[24] Stéphane Courtois is a member of, among others, the Scientific board of the International Centre for Studies into Communism and periodically attends the colloquia held by the Sighet Memorial to the Victims of Communism and to the Resistance (Romania). Courtois compiled historical data for the Göran Lindblad report adopted by the European Parliament in 2005: 'The Need for International Condemnation of the Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes'.

Among Thierry Wolton's books, see *Une histoire mondiale du communisme* (Vol. 1, *Les Bourreaux*, 2015; Vol. 2, *Les Victimes*, 2015; Vol. 3, *Les Complices*, 2017), Grasset, Paris, 2017 and *Penser le communisme*, Grasset, Paris, 2021.

On the militant anti-communist style in research, let me quote Romanian professor Dan Pavel: 'it is scandalous that not even at a historical, cultural or symbolic level is there any consensus on the criminal nature of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (…) Despite the fact that since the Great Party paradigmatic of communism was outlawed the evidence has been multiplying and is irrefutable, a significant part of Western, Russian and East-European academic circles continue to dislike and to reject the facts regarding the criminal and genocidal behaviour of the party in question' (Dan Pavel, *Grajdurile lui Augias. Rituri de purificare în postatotalitarism*, Polirom, Jassy, 2017, p. 220).

[25] At a different conceptual level, the debate on militant theories, on the association of theorists with militancy, on the tension between truth, fair play and purpose can be found in the scholactivism/scholarship dichotomy, with positions that are now enthusiastic towards, now sceptical of scholactivism. As Rebecca Farnum puts it, '"scholactivism" is an umbrella term for the approach taken by an increasing number of academics who believe they have a role to play in creating social justice – and who do something about it." – A growing movement of scholar-activists,' *University World News*, 3 June 2016 - https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20160530142606345). For a sceptical position, see Tarunabh Khaitan: 'Like many role-constrained actors who best realize certain role-extraneous goals only indirectly, a scholar is more likely to contribute to a more just world by eschewing the direct pursuit of specific material outcomes' (Tarunabh Khaitan, 'On scholactivism in constitutional studies: Skeptical thoughts', *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 8 August 2022, moac039 - https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moac039. I would draw a line between the two attitudes, arguing that respect for the truth always serves social justice in the long term, whereas the wish for social justice sometimes conflicts with the truth.

[26] For a dense and comprehensive book on the subject, see: Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, Alexander M. Martin, *Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914–1945*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012.

[27] The diversion of attention, often by means of various types of whataboutism, dilutes the crimes that most seriously affect human sensitivity. Nevertheless, sometimes there may also be strong grounds for shifting the discussion from 'absolute horror' to collateral subjects. One example is the criticism of the use of minors in *First They Killed My Father* (2017), directed by Angelina Jolie, a film about the suffering of children during the Kampuchean genocide. Bringing to light the suffering of children is just as legitimate as a concern that the filming should not have affected the sensibilities of the child actors.

[28] Michael Halberstam, *Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999, p. 6. Halberstam follows the German philosophical tradition that stretches from Kant to Heidegger. He does not deny the value of the concept of 'totalitarianism', but rather reinterprets it.

[29] The concept of totalitarianism 'appeared as an overly mechanistic model foisted upon them by political scientist. Time and again, historians have come away disenchanted from the concept because it proved unhelpful in articulating new research questions and in organizing empirical findings. Moreover, with the deescalation of the Cold War in the context of East-West detente, the time seemed right to leave behind concepts and ideas that had a distinctly polemical, if not outright ideological, quality. Empirical historians, in particular, came to consider terms and concepts like totalitarianism contaminated by their Cold War exploitation'. It is to be noted how 'the academic notion of fascism […] collapsed under the combined weight of left-wing political dogmatism and the pervasive discrediting of leftist thought during the last quarter of the twentieth century and is only just now resurfacing.'After Totalitarianism – Stalinism and Nazism Compared,' in Michael Geyer, Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 8.). On multiple viewpoints in the field of microhistory, see István M. Szijártó, Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon, *What Is Microhistory? Theory and Practice*, Routledge, London-New York, 2013.

[30] Claire Zalc, Tal Bruttmann, *Microhistories of the Holocaust*, Berghahn Books, New York, 2019.

[31] Muriel Blaive, '"Hidden Transcripts" and Microhistory as a Comparative Tool: Two Case Studies in Communist Czechoslovakia', *East Central Europe*, Vol. 40, Issues 1-2, Jan 2013.

[32] Constantin Iordachi, '"Remembering" versus "Condemning" Communism', in Constantin Iordachi, Péter Apor (eds.), *Occupation and Communism in Eastern European Museums*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2021, p. 17.

[33] See Macur Olson's definition of Soviet-style autocracies as governments geared towards extracting the maximum resources from society (Mancur Olson, *Power and Prosperity. Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships*, Basic Books, New York, 2000). In Romania, for an at least implicit critique of the concept of 'totalitarianism', see Adrian Miroiu: *Fuga de competiție. O perspectivă instituțională asupra societății românești,* Polirom, Jassy, 2016 and *O introducere în știința politică. Alegeri, acțiune colectivă și instituții*, Tritonic, București, 2017, in particular Chapter 5 'Instituții și acțiune colectivă', pp. 491-634).

[34] See Jean-Charles Szurek's critique of the younger or very young generations which 'allows itself to judge the previous generation en bloc, without knowing its complex conditions of existence and submission to the Nazi or Stalinist boot', a position which 'cannot contribute to clarifying thingsallows itself to judge the previous generation en bloc, without knowing its complex conditions of existence and submission to the Nazi or Stalinist boot', a position which 'cannot contribute to clarifying things' (Jean-Charles Szurek, 'Pentru o memorie democratică a trecuturilor traumatizante', in *Colegiul Noua Europă, Istoria recentă în Europa. Obiecte de Studiu, Surse, Metode*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 2002, p. 67 - https://nec.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/JEAN-CHARLES_SZUREK.pdf).

[35] On the case of Milan Kundera see Adam Hradilek and Petr Třešňák, 'Udání Milana Kundery' (The Denunciation of Milan Kundera), *Respekt*, 19, No. 42, 13 October 2008, pp. 38-46). For a broader examination of the case, see Muriel Blaive, 'L'ouverture des archives d'une police politique communiste: le cas tchèque, de Zdena Salivarová à Milan Kundera', in Sonia Combe (ed.), *Archives et écriture de l'histoire dans les sociétés post-communistes*, La Découverte, Paris, 2009), pp. 203-226 (https://ciera.hypotheses.org/160#identifier_32_160). On the case of Lech Wałęsa, see Steven Erlanger, 'Polish Watchdog Nips at Walesa's Heels,' *The New York Times*, August 21, 2000 (https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/21/world/polish-watchdog-nips-at-walesa-s-heels.html?pagewanted=all) and Joanna Berendt, 'Labeling Him a Communist Informer,' *The New York Times*, January 31, 2017 (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/europe/poland-lech-walesa-communist-report.html).

[36] Crispin Sartwell, 'The Left-Right Political Spectrum Is Bogus,' *The Atlantic*, June 20, 2014 - https://bit.ly/43ZNDrN. Sartwell provides conflicting examples: corporatist capitalism has always depended on state power, and the basic impulse of left-wing statism has always been to annex the economy; the left supports 'equality' as a fundamental value, but the means put forward by leftists to increase economic equality almost always increast political and other inequality.

[37] Yves Ternon, *Statul criminal. Genocidurile secolului XX*, Institutul European, Jassy, 2002. p. 130.

[38] These would be the reference points for a pragmatic vision of human rights. The reference point perhaps closest to the paradigm of this book is Richard Rorty, in particular *Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

[39] John Kekes, *Against Liberalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1997, p. 183.

[40] Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1985, p. 44.

[41] Richard Rorty, *Contingency, irony, and solidarity...*, 1989, p. xv.
[42] Alain Finkielkraut, *O inimă inteligentă*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2017, p. 188.
[43] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1961.
[44] Norman Davies, *No simple Victory...*, p. 12.
[45] Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, Basicurn Books, New York, 2010; Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*, Tim Duggan Books, New York, 2015.
[46] Sean McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, Allen Lane, Dublin, 2021.
[47] The expression 'Western ineptitude' occurs in Sean McMeekin, *Stalin's War…*). McMeekin also speaks of how German diplomats were just as 'inept' when dealing with Stalin, which just went to show how perfidious the Kremlin leader was. U.S. investigations conducted after the break-up of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 (see John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000), as well as by English, French and Central- and Eastern-European researchers (see Mária Schmidt, *Battle of Wits*: *Beliefs, Ideologies, and Secret Agents in the 20th Century*, Century Institute and Office of History, Budapest, 2007), have demonstrated that communist-bloc spies and 'fellow travellers' infiltrated the Western élite to a significant degree. It should be noted that after the fall of the communist régimes, access to secrets about espionage operations against the West was granted only in exceptional cases. One significant reason was that former intelligence officers remained in the new intelligence agencies, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. One notorious case is Hungary, about which a spy who had previously worked for a decade and a half in the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution was to say: 'The original sin in Hungary after the fall of communism was not to effect a root-and-branch clearing of the country's intelligence agencies.' (Jamie Dettmer, 'Former Spy: Hungary Used as Logistics Base for Russian Intelligence Activity', *VOA News*, 17 April 2019 - https://bit.ly/3OQbciw). As a result, in the decades that followed, all the Russian intelligence services—the G.R.U., F.S.B. and S.V.R.—that were given a free hand became very active in Hungary. The International Investments Bank, an arm of the former Comecon, relocated to Budapest, and its staff were granted diplomatic immunity. It was not until 13 April 2023, the day after the U.S. imposed sanctions on three of the bank's directors, that Hungary withdraw from the International Investments Bank, which then announced its departure from Budapest ('IIB Says It's Leaving Budapest After U.S. Sanctions Hit Hungarian Officials at Bank', RFE/RL, April 19, 2023 - https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-iib-bank-leaves-budapest-russia-sanctions/32370658.html.)
Romania is another textbook case. After the December 1989 Revolution, Mihai Caraman was appointed head of the new Foreign Intelligence Service, having been well known for heading Romania's espionage operates in Paris from 1958 to 1968. From this position, he infiltrated the Headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He was the only Securitate officer to be decorated by the K.G.B. 'for outstanding results against N.A.T.O.' The most important information about the ways in which Romanian espionage served the Communist régime still remains that revealed by Mihai Pacepa in 1987 (*Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief*, Regnery Gateway, Washington, 1987; a Romanian version was published in 1988: *Orizonturi roşii*:*Memoriile unui fost general de securitate*, Editura Universul, New York).
[48] Further details of these ideas: 'why he pays more attention and delivers more moving and emotional descriptions to some forms of ethnic and political terror, like the famine in 1933–4, or the killing of Polish war prisoners by Soviets in Katyń, than to the pogroms in 1941 or the liquidation of Soviet prisoners by the Germans. He thereby spins webs of significance that are problematic and leaves the impression of judging different forms of ethnic and political violence by different values and thus being more or less respectful to victims depending on the political nature of the terror that killed them.' (Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, 'Debating, obfuscating and disciplining the Holocaust: post-Soviet historical discourses on the OUN–UPA and other nationalist movements', *East European Jewish Affairs*, vol. 42, No. 3, 2012, p. 223.
[49] *Bloodlands* not only provides the necessary evidence, but does so with empathy. The book was written within a certain academic context. According to the logic of Rossoliński-Liebe, books about communism ought to be criticised if they do not highlight abuses specifically aimed at women, and books about Nazi crimes, when they make only marginal reference to crimes against the disabled and homosexuals.
[50] Alain Besançon, *A Century of Horrors. Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Shoah*, ISI Books, Wilmington, Delaware, 2007, p. 102.
'Hypermnesia of Nazi horrors' enters into synergy with the Jewish communities all over the world that keep watch over the memory of those horrors (and the traumas of historical anti-Semitism more generally) taking upon themselves an exceptionalism which, in certain situations, they believe 'liberates' them from the authority of certain principles of decent societies.

On 19 July 2018, the Knesset passed a law defining Israel as the National State of the Jewish People. ('Achievement of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel belongs solely to the Jewish people', Article 1 (c)). This is at odds with the principles of International Law, which grants the right to self-determination to all citizens *as a whole* within the territory of a state. The Knesset decision was to be met by political and academic criticism. The publisher's online presentation of Yaacov Yadgar, *Israel's Jewish Identity Crisis. State and Politics in the Middle East* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), dated 9 January 2020, employs terms such as 'the infamous law' and 'Israel's inability also to take account of Jewish political identity' (criticisms brought by Yadgar).
In accordance with the 1950 Law of Return, all Jews have the right to Israeli citizenship unless they have committed serious crimes. In 1954, the Law of Return was amended to allow the Interior Minister to reject Israeli citizenship for any Jew 'with a criminal record who might endanger public order'. But during the Ukraine crisis of 2020, a number of Russian-Jewish magnates with good working relations with the Kremlin sought and received Israeli citizenship and residence, as a form of insurance policy. They were removed from Western sanctions against Putin's collaborators, passed in 2022, which some of Israel's partners see as sabotaging collective international responsibilities (David Israel, 'West Critical of Israel's Sheltering Russian-Jewish Tycoons, Will Law of Return Be Undermined?' *The Jewish Press*, 14 March 2022 - https://bit.ly/45kQbSj).

[51] Jacob Mchangama, 'Europe and free speech: A race to the bottom?' 3 August 2015 - https://euobserver.com/opinion/129823.

[52] See the hyperbolic examples of political correctness such as trigger warnings, microaggressions, and catastrophising given in A. R. Hanlon, 'The Trigger Warning Myth,' *New Republic*, 14 August 2015; likewise the condemnation of cultural appropriation by majorities (Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, 'The Coddling of the American Mind,' *The Atlantic*, September 2015).

[53] 'Tribunal backs university after it dismissed professor who said jews aren't even a race and promoted positive stereotypes about jews and other racial groups' (*Campaign against anti-Semitism*, 23 July 2020 - https://bit.ly/44Wx0hU).

In Europe, even universities as such, which traditionally enjoy autonomy, have been placed under political pressure to adopt 'standards of memory' (*Campaign against anti-Semitism*, 'University of Warwick condemned in House of Commons for refusing to adopt international definition of antisemitism, as all universities called on to do so', 29 January 2010 - https://bit.ly/3YuCQo9).

[54] For example, Ian Buruma was forced to step down as editor of *The New York Reviews of Books* and in 2020, and James Bennet from *The New York Times*.

[55] See Gabriel Andreescu, 'The Opportunistic Society: Incoherent, Variable, Disproportionate and Unpredictable Behaviors,' *European Journal of Science and Theology*, Vol. 9, June 2013, pp. 3-13.

[56] Jewish Virtual Library, 'When Did the World Find Out About the Holocaust?' - https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/when-did-the-world-find-out-about-the-holocaust.

[57] I here quote Mihnea Berindei: '[To Ion Antonescu] may be accused of being a war criminal. But for his accusers during the 1946 trial this was merely a pretext. Antonescu was executed because he had led the Romanian Army in a war against the Soviet Union that was initially victorious' (Mihnea Berindei, 'Antisemitismul nu era doar apanajul lui Antonescu', in Gabriel Andreescu (ed.), *România versus România*, Editura Clavis, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 115-118).

[58] Many of the controversies that arose during the B.L.M. campaigns of 2020 were ultimately trivial. The English-language Israeli press was largely critical of B.L.M. and the toppling of statues. In a mordantly titled article ('Yes, But Can They Blow Him Off Mount Rushmore? Teddy Roosevelt Persona Non Grata at Museum of Natural History') Yori Yanover commented on the decision of the director of the American National History Museum in New York City, Ellen V. Futte, to have the bronze sculpture of James Earle Fraser moved. Yanover's reaction: 'God save the declining United States of America'. In his article he lists a number of Roosevelt's achievements: 'Teddy Roosevelt was one of America's most beloved presidents. His two-term presidency ushered in the century of American greatness. He was a conservationist and a naturalist, he was the personification of the anti-trust policies and the Progressive Era policies, for heaven's sake, he is up there, carved on Mount Rushmore together with the three other most beloved presidents, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln'. He concludes: 'And all of that glory is now being disregarded because of sculptor James Earle Fraser's romantic notion of flanking the immortal Teddy with members of two other races in America, who didn't get to ride the horsie, too.' (Yori Yanover, 'Yes, But Can They Blow Him Off Mount Rushmore? Teddy Roosevelt Persona Non Grata at Museum of Natural History', *The JewishPress*, 22 June 2020 - https://bit.ly/3s0z9KV.

[59] For example, the statement of Margalit, p. 81, op.cit.: 'The way for the Germans to reestablish themselves as an ethical community is to turn their cruelty, which was what tied them to jews, into repentance'. The statement operates with a trans-temporal collective identity, with Germans as a community of cruel people. This identity might be altered if they were to 'change their cruelty' through 'repentance'. I consider it to be problematic to judge people by atemporal categories ('the Germans'), even if they are often tempting.

[60]. In most league tables of the communist bloc, Albania comes bottom. But even so, in the final decade of communism, not even Albania achieved the degradation of social life found in Romania.

[61] Mass killings also took place on Romanian soil. In the Jassy Pogrom, which began on 28 June 1941, and in the cattle trucks in which they were loaded, around 14,580 Jews died (Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (eds.), *Raport final*, International Commission for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania, 2004, Chapters: 'The Iași Pogrom: The First Phase of the Physical Destruction of the Jews in Romania', pp. 118-123; 'The Death Trains of Iași', pp. 123-125. Electronic version: http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/files/Raport%20Final/Raport_final.pdf.pdf.

[62] Radu Ioanid, *The Ransom of the Jews. The Story of the Extraordinary Secret Bargain Between Romania and Israel*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York, London, 2021.

[63] Among others: in Romania, negation and trivialisation of the Holocaust is punishable, but not negation and trivialisation of the crimes of communism. In schools, the subject of the history of communism is optional, but in 2021 a law was passed making the history of the Jews and the Holocaust compulsory.

[64] Pierre Nora, 'L'ère de la commémoration' in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les Lieux de mémoire*, vol. 3 Les France, Gallimard, Paris, 1992, p. 977.

[65] Tzvetan Todorov, 'Memory as Remedy for Evil', *Journal of International Criminal* Justice 7(3), July 2009, pp. 447-462 - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240583299_Memory_as_Remedy_for_Evil.

[66] David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting. Historical Memory and Its Ironies,* Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2016, pp. 42, 110.